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ABSTRACT This article focuses on the role of institutionalization of public policies in the EU
member states’ response to Europeanization in energy-related policy domain. The article ﬁrst
provides a critical overview of the ‘‘goodness of ﬁt’’ logic. It is argued that such a logic is
problematic in explaining the policy change and the policy development at the domestic level.
Then the article proposes to integrate the goodness of ﬁt framework with the analysis of the
degree of institutionalization of national policies. Comparative analysis of the development of the
French and Italian electricity policy during the 1990s conﬁrms that the institutionalization of
public policies is an important dimension that has been missed by the literature on
Europeanization. The study of institutionalization is useful in that it clariﬁes the diﬀerent
degrees and directions of policy change under similar European adaptive pressures.
Introduction
Studies on Europeanization have grown rapidly in the last decade, in particular in
the ﬁeld of public policy. The attention of scholars is generally focused on the impact
of Europeanization on national public policy; however, few frameworks have been
developed which are useful to explain the diﬀerent conﬁgurations of that process and
its outcomes in diﬀerent countries or policy areas (Radaelli 2003, Bulmer and
Radaelli 2005). The main general explanatory model that has been elaborated with
respect to the mechanisms and impact of Europeanization is the ‘‘goodness of ﬁt
model’’ (Cowles Green et al. 2001, Bo¨rzel and Risse 2003). The goodness of ﬁt model
is useful to address certain mechanisms of Europeanization, but it has some limits
too. In particular, the goodness of ﬁt model, which is based on institutional theory,
yields only a reductive and static image of relevant institutions; it fails to consider the
multidimensional nature of institutions and the process of institutionalization in a
systematic manner. In the ﬁrst section of this article, I will discuss the problems
related to the use of ‘‘goodness of ﬁt’’ logic in explaining the policy change and the
policy development in the cases of the French and Italian electricity policy during the
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1990s. Then I will present some elements that may facilitate the study of
Europeanization and policy change based on the analysis of institutionalization,
with the aid of sociological and historical institutionalism. In the second section, I
will evaluate the proposed hypothesis on the basis of research conducted on the
Europeanization of electricity policy in France and Italy.1 I will use the classiﬁcation
of policy elements and the taxonomy of policy development proposed by Cashore
and Howlett (2007) in order to present a more accurate measurement of the degree
and direction of policy change under European pressure. Finally, I will use the
ﬁndings of this research to suggest the role of institutionalization as mediating factor
of Europeanization. Studying the impact of Europeanization in the electricity sector
is important because it facilitates the analysis of the ‘‘net impact’’ of European
integration (Levi-Faur 2004). The electricity policy is a useful specimen because, in
this sector, neither technological change nor global competition was a signiﬁcant
driver of market reforms (Bartle 2005: 96). In addition, the emergence of EU-level
market reforms in electricity is well documented (Schmidt 1998, Eising and Jabko
2001, Jabko 2006), and it is possible to concentrate on the implementation stage at
national level.
Europeanization and Institutionalization: The Missing Dimension
European Policy and Domestic Policy: Misﬁt and Policy Change
The goodness of ﬁt framework is based upon the degree of ﬁt between European and
national institutions and policies; in case of a ‘‘misﬁt’’, Europeanization exerts a
general adaptive pressure for institutional or policy change (Cowles Green et al. 2001).
According to Cowles Green and colleagues, the interesting cases are those where the
adaptational pressures are signiﬁcant. In such cases a sort of stalemate is expected
between EU institution and domestic institution resulting in severe implementation
deﬁcit (Cowles Green et al. 2001: 8). As pointed out by Bo¨rzel and Risse (2003: 70),
according to the logic of sociological institutionalism high adaptational pressure is
likely to meet strong institutional inertia preventing any domestic change; in case the
process of adaptation evolves along the same institutional path. This conventional
construct of Europeanization views ‘‘goodness of ﬁt’’ between the European and
national institutional and policy settings as a key indicator of the level of adaptational
pressure. However the usefulness of this concept in the empirical analysis of policy
change is problematic (Mendez et al. 2008). This is the case of the dynamic of the
French and Italian electricity policy during the 1990s.
At the end of the 1980s, the European Commission elaborated the ﬁrst proposal
for the Internal Energy Market (IEM). The idea was to overcome the ‘‘energy
exception’’ and to treat the electricity and gas sectors like any other regulated sector,
and thus to integrate it into the common market framework (Matla´ry 1997). In the
electricity sector, the European Commission tried to promote a policy programme
based upon a new organizational model of the electricity industry (De Paoli 2001).
With the adoption of Directive 96/92/EC, approved after a long and intense debate
between the member states and the European Commission (Schmidt 1998; Padgett
2003), that model was partly incorporated into European law and was later
conﬁrmed by Directive 2003/54/EC. Based on a new paradigm and setting coming
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from the market approach to energy policy, the EU policy programme contrasted
sharply with those of many European countries.2
That was the case of both France and Italy. In each of these countries, the
electricity sector was organized, after nationalization, in a similar way as regards
ownership, industrial structure and regulation (De Paoli 1993, 2001). The
nationalization laws that created Enel, Ente nazionale energia elettrica (1962) and
Edf, E´lectricite´ de France (1946), established two large state-owned companies that
were vertically integrated, with a legal monopoly in all segments of the electricity
industry. The regulation of the sector was in the hands of the central government, in
particular the Ministry of Industry. These policy instruments were accompanied by
the idea that public intervention is motivated by economic considerations –
preventing market failure – but, in addition, by social and political considerations
because access to electricity was considered a ‘‘right’’ to be guaranteed to all people
within the territory. Following the taxonomy proposed by Cashore and Howlett
(2007) is possible to distinguish in a more accurate manner the main policy
elements – policy focus and policy content – of the ‘‘Traditional policy regime’’
(French and Italian cases) and of the ‘‘New policy regime’’ (according to the market
approach) of the electricity sector as a complex mix of ends and means-related goals,
objectives, and setting (Table 1).
Due to these diﬀerences during the 1990s in Italy and in France, there was a long
debate on the reform of the electricity sector under the inﬂuence of the European
Table 1. Traditional policy regime (TPR) and new policy regime (NPR) in electricity sector,
following the taxonomy of policy measures of Cashore and Howlett (2007)
Policy content
Goals Objectives Settings
Policy focus
Ends TPR: Overall social,
economical and
political development
TPR: State intervention
to prevent market
failure and to
strengthen the energy
industry
TPR: Integrated
industrial structure
(To enhance
co-ordination and
economy of scale)
NPR: Separation
between the political
and social goals and
the management of the
electricity sector
NPR: Liberalization and
privatization to
improve eﬃciency and
inexpensiveness of
electricity provision
NPR: De-integrated
industrial structure (to
enhance competition)
Means TPR: Use of coercive
instruments
TPR: Public enterprise TPR: State ownership to
strengthen the control
of the central
government on the
electricity policy
NPR: Preferences for
market mechanism to
guarantee
co-ordination and
eﬃciency of electricity
sector
NPR: Market regulation NPR: Private ownership,
regulation trough
authority, wholesale
electricity market
French and Italian Electricity Policy 493
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policy process. In the end, the result in Italy was a more market-oriented reform,
while a more conservative reform was realized in France (Campidoglio and Vaciago
1999, Glachant and Finon 2003).
Furthermore, in France the policy change was very slow, the French government
delays the implementation of directive 96/92/EC until February 2000, even if the
expiry date of the period for the transposition of the directive was the February of
1999. In the Italian case the policy change was more rapid, and the government was
able to adopt the directive 96/92/CE in time to comply with European requirements.
The French case seems to conﬁrm the goodness-of-ﬁt hypothesis, i.e. a low degree
of change and incremental policy evolution in the case of ‘‘high misﬁt’’ (since
domestic institutions defended their own integrity), but the Italian case does not
conﬁrm that hypothesis. In spite of a high inconsistency between European policy
and the domestic policy in Italy, a more pronounced and rapid policy change
occurred. Although Italy and France had a similar policy regime, there were certain
diﬀerences that depended on the institutional context in which the process of
Europeanization was inserted. Electricity policies are closely interconnected with
general energy and economic policies of the state, and in both cases they are
inﬂuenced by the conditions of institutional context; the institutionalization of
electricity policies in these countries is diﬀerent because in each case there were
diﬀerent political and administrative frameworks.
As noted by Morlino (2002: 5–6), in the ‘‘goodness of ﬁt’’ framework Cowles
Green, Caporaso and Risse assume that domestic institutions are all of the same
status, and that they have a similar ability to resist European adaptive pressure. If
domestic institutions are well established and entrenched, the actors involved will be
well deﬁned and conscious of their strategies. But the situation could be diﬀerent:
institutions might be in transition or crisis (Morlino 2002, Morlino et al. 2006), or
they could be undergoing a redeﬁnition. In some institutional contexts, therefore, the
search for appropriateness by actors is more probable than the resistance (March
and Olsen 1989). The problem of institutional and policy change in the context of
Europeanization would be considered not as change due to external pressure, but as
a matter of co-evolution of national and European policies (Olsen 2002), each
inﬂuencing the other. Domestic factors would be the starting point to address the
process at work in the analyzed policy process (Radaelli 2003). Institutional theory,
which inspired Europeanization studies (Vink and Graziano 2006: 17), underlines
that the endogenous dynamics of institutions are fundamental to explain
institutional change, even if the focus is on exogenous variables, because endogenous
factors mediate the inﬂuence of external change. In particular, the capacity of an
institution to defend its internal dynamics and logic from external pressure is linked
to its degree of institutionalization (Lanzalaco 1995). In similar conditions, the same
adaptive pressure may have diﬀerent eﬀects due to varying degrees of institutiona-
lization, whether the object of the pressure is an institution, a social relationship, a
political system or a public policy.
Institutionalization of Public Policy
Public policies are – or may become – institutions, deﬁned as sets of rules, norms,
routines or social practices that give legitimacy and meaning to actions and lock
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individual and organizational behaviours in paradigms which are guidelines for
actors’ strategies (Gualmini 1998, Capano 2009).3 Like any other institution, the
capacity of a public policy to preserve its internal development logic and to evolve in a
path-dependent manner is strongly conditioned by its degree of institutionalization.
Measuring institutionalization is one of the most challenging issues for
institutional theory (Peters 1999). Institutionalization can be interpreted as a process
or as a feature of an institution. As a process, it can be analyzed only in a diachronic
perspective.4 As a feature, it can vary along a continuum from a minimum to a
maximum level; an institution can be characterized in a particular period by a high
or a low degree of institutionalization. According to institutional theory, the main
operational characteristic of institutionalization can be summed up in a few key
words:5 diﬀerentiation, internal cohesion, autonomy, coherence, legitimacy and
embeddedness.
In order to consider the institutionalization of a public policy, we can focus on
three main dimensions of the policy: organizational structures, procedural structures
and normative structures (Table 2).6 At the organizational level, the institutionaliza-
tion of policy is determined by the diﬀerentiation of organizations from its
environment and by its internal cohesion. In this way, the main actors in the policy
domain have an independent standing, accountability, and resources detached from
the general political arena. Other government actors and interests cannot enter the
policy arena and unilaterally shape policy outcomes. This dimension can be referred
to as the conﬁguration of the organizational ﬁeld of public policy (Di Maggio 1986):
the presence of a predominant coalition among actors which has the resources
necessary to maintain control over the policy domain. Organizational cohesion
suggests clearly deﬁned patterns of interaction among the units for speciﬁc
organizational tasks, allowing them to achieve a stable output that meets the
policy’s goals (Lenschow and Zito 1998). In this context, actors have clearly deﬁned
roles which are functionally diﬀerent in the sense that they are not interchangeable
(Polsby 1968). Along the organizational dimension, the more pronounced the
policy’s impermeability is – with respect to other policy area or politics and with
respect to others actors – the more eﬀective the policy’s diﬀerentiation, autonomy,
and internal cohesion.
With regard to the procedural structure, an important element is whether the
procedures produce clear signals about what constitutes appropriate behaviour. By
contrast, if these principles are ignored or weakened by inadequate implementation
measures, institutionalization is likely to be low. In this respect, an important
indicator of institutionalization is the capacity to gain consensus and legitimacy with
Table 2. Institutionalization dimension and indicators for public policy
Institutionalization
dimension for public policy
Operational characteristics
of institutionalization Indicators
Organizational structure – diﬀerentiation – impermeability of policy
– internal cohesion
Procedural structure – legitimacy – policy output acceptance
Normative structure – coherence – policy paradigm in policy domain
French and Italian Electricity Policy 495
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respect to policy outputs. A public policy presents a high degree of institutionalization
if the policy outcomes are not signiﬁcantly conditioned by territorial or social factors,
and when decisions are implemented without provoking progressive social conﬂict
and without redeﬁning the substantive policy content each time (Tebaldi 1999). On
the contrary, when decisions provoke conﬂict and decision makers have to reconsider
a policy’s substantive content, the degree of policy’s institutionalization is low.
The impact of corresponding normative structures depends on their coherence (at
what level do normative elements relate or contradict each other?) and embedded-
ness in the process (to what degree are these elements reﬂected in the rules of the
game, and how they are accepted by the relevant policy actors?) (Lenschow and Zito
1998). In general, institutionalization is related to the stability and formality of the
institutional process and principles; given a high level of institutionalization, actors
have less scope to ignore the rules or to interpret them in ways that may not accord
with the original premise (Lenschow and Zito 1998). Along this dimension, a public
policy presents a high degree of institutionalization if there are not many policy
paradigms in competition in the policy domain.7 Public policy is thus highly
institutionalized if in the policy domain a single paradigm predominates. This
indicator can be appropriate regarding the normative dimension of public policy
because policy paradigms tend to incorporate normative codes in a community (Hall
1993, Lanzalaco 1995, Sabatier 1999, Surel 2000).
Institutionalization and Europeanization of Electricity Policy in France and Italy
Genesis, Evolution and Institutionalization of National Electricity Policies
France. In the French case, since the 1950s policy making in the electricity sector has
been characterized by the predominant role of: the managers of Edf, the biggest
trade unions of the energy sector (in particular Cgt-Energie – Confe´de´ration Ge´ne´rale
du Travail), and by the administrative structures of tutelle, in particular the Ministry
of Industry. These actors, tied together by a common conception of service public, by
a common conﬁdence in scientiﬁc knowledge, and – with regard to the managers and
high civil servants in public administration – by common origins and socialization in
the Grandes e´coles, emerged as the predominant policy coalition in the critical
juncture that led to the nationalization of the industry. In fact, these actors could
enjoy, both inside and outside the policy ﬁeld, legitimacy and consensus vis-a`-vis
citizens for their leadership and for their decisions, which were considered in line
with the national priorities of the time (reconstruction and development). These
actors have control over technical, economic, organizational, ideological and
normative resources (public service and national interest), so they can prevent other
actors from ‘‘co-determining’’ the result of policy making. The developments of the
1960s and 1970s conﬁrm this process of institutionalization. The nuclear programme
enforces the role of Edf in the policy domain and conﬁrms the company’s capacity to
conduct, with the support of the Ministry of Industry, the French energy policy. In
this period, the control over technical and normative resources by these actors (Edf
and administrative structures) makes it possible to legitimize policy choices
regarding eﬃciency (the best solution in cost–beneﬁt terms) and appropriateness
(the best solution for the modernization of the country); it also allows decisions by
496 A. Prontera
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consensus. Indeed, with the nuclear programme of the 1970s, electricity policy
became a privileged ﬁeld of the strategies of national independence, translated in the
promotion of the French industrial and economic system. Edf became the symbol
and the instrument of the national strategy of independence. In this way, the
coalition of predominant actors strengthened its capability to take control over
normative resources in the policy ﬁeld, because the main actors could claim that
what was ‘‘good for Edf’’ was ‘‘good for France’’. The ﬁrst important criticism of
electricity policy and of the main actors came in the 1980s, when the socialist party in
the government tried to regionalize Edf, i.e. to transform the organizational
structure of the electricity sector. These policy options, which would have changed
the role of the central administration, conceding more power to local administrations
in the regulation of Edf’s activities, failed because of the ability of the predominant
coalition to mobilize substantial resources to prevent the policy change; this is a
signal of high policy stability. Although the contestation against the nuclear
programme became more pronounced, the continuity with the electro-nuclear option
decided by the socialist government renovated and strengthened the role of the
traditional actors in the policy ﬁeld. The same dynamics were operative in the second
part of the 1980s with right-wing parties in the government. The attempt to change
the electricity policy, applying the new economic doctrine of deregulation, failed due
to the active opposition of the administrative Grandes corps and of high civil servants
in the Ministry of Industry and Finance. This event, the failure of a neo-liberal
transformation in the electricity sector, is the further demonstration of the policy’s
capacity to evolve autonomously with respect to the political dynamics.
The implementation of the electro-nuclear programme, without amplifying
political conﬂicts, in particular with local actors – considering its enormous scale –
conﬁrms the high degree of the policy’s institutionalization along the output
dimension. Moreover, the fact that the original policy regime was never questioned is
an important stability factor in the relationship between the diﬀerent components of
Edf (managers and trade unions) and high civil servants in the public administration.
This institutional setting is linked to a coherent normative frame that accords
legitimacy to public intervention in energy sector and is based upon the
predominance of a unique paradigm in the policy domain, a paradigm that excludes
market logic from electricity policy.
Italy. The central role of political parties in policy making and in the formulation of
Enel’s business strategies characterized Italy’s electricity policy in the 1960s. That
state of aﬀairs, as well as the absence of a strong public administration with
important technical resources and legitimacy, and the lack of cohesion between
employees and managers of the new company, hindered the consolidation of a
predominant coalition in the ‘‘critical juncture’’ of the law that nationalized Enel in
1962. The main role played by political parties in policy formulation (due to their
presence in the government, in the parliament and in all the government committees
responsible for energy sector) and in policy implementation (due to their inﬂuence on
operational strategies, which was assured by their prevalence on Enel’s board), made
the policy highly permeable to actors outside the policy ﬁeld and to special interests
(lack of autonomy). This was the case of electro-nuclear policy in the 1970s. Enel
could not lead the programme because certain industrial groups opposed Enel’s
French and Italian Electricity Policy 497
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Pr
on
te
ra
, 
An
dr
ea
] 
At
: 
07
:5
3 
28
 O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
0
strategies and proposed two diﬀerent technological options, with important
operational consequences that could be overcome only in the 1980s. The
technological choice was not the result of Enel’s strategies or of a unitary electro-
nuclear strategy; rather, it was made by political parties according to a logic of
wealth distribution. In the same period, the permeability of the policy ﬁeld with
respect to external interests (in this case pushed by trade unions) was evident in the
government’s decisions on electricity tariﬀs. The electricity tariﬀs were determined as
a function of party politics. The eﬀect was the permanent ﬁnancial distress of Enel,
which was unable to negotiate an increase of tariﬀs until the continued provision of
service was at risk. The ‘‘tariﬀ politics’’ was also evident from the political exchange
between government and large industrial groups (Clo` 1994). These groups managed
to secure a low tariﬀ scheme, to the detriment of Enel’s ﬁnancial stability, despite the
fact that the government’s policy of oil substitution in electricity generation was
ineﬀective. With regard to the second dimension of institutionalization, on the policy
outcomes side, programmes were ineﬀective and produced many conﬂicts (i.e.
between national and local government on the electro-nuclear programme), which
induced the government to reconsider its policy objectives. The main characteristic
of electricity policy during the 1970s was the incongruence between government’s
decisions and policy outcomes. The lack of implementation of the government’s
energy plan (Piani energetici nazionali, or ‘‘Pen’’), led the government to a new
decision-making process (the ‘‘Pen review’’). This circular process weakened the
legitimacy and credibility of decision makers’ strategies. These conditions, which led
to a low degree of institutionalization of policy, were more pronounced in the 1980s.
The political parties’ division on energy programmes and the inﬂuence of their local
components transformed the procedure of localization for new power plants –
nuclear and coal-ﬁred facilities – into an exhausting negotiation between central and
local government. The policy’s permeability with respect to political dynamics was
more evident at the end of the Italian electro-nuclear programme. Party politics and
coalition politics allowed green movements – which were hardly organized at all – to
enter the policy ﬁeld as de facto veto players.
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Italian government sought to reform the energy
sector. Law no. 9 and Law no. 10 of 1991 started to undermine certain elements of
the original policy regime, allowing a marginal liberalization in the electricity
generation. Then, in 1992, Law no. 359, decided in August in the midst of a public
budget crisis, transformed Enel into a joint-stock company (thus setting the stage for
privatization). Although the state maintained ownership of the new company, this
choice weakened, in a more pronounced manner, the original policy programme.
The policy ﬁeld was thus characterized at that time by two diﬀerent kinds of logic:
the ﬁrst was connected with the monopolistic and vertically integrated structure of
the original model; and the second was connected with the idea of privatization and
liberalization of the energy sector, according to the new organizational model in
energy markets. Elements of diﬀerent policy paradigms began to cohabit the same
policy domain; there was no longer predominance of a single paradigm.
Furthermore, the period 1991–1996 was characterized by the crisis of the Italian
party system (Cotta and Isernia 1996). This crisis also related to the legitimacy of
party government and of the intervention of the state in the economic sectors (Di
Palma et al. 2000). Within a short period of time, the crisis of parties and of the party
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system disadvantaged the traditional players in electricity policy making and
provoked a change in the structure of relationships in the policy ﬁeld.
During the formulation of Directive 96/92/EC, Italian electricity policy was thus
characterized by a low degree of institutionalization; although formally the policy
programme was launched long ago, i.e. with the nationalization of the industry in
1962, the actors and the relationships that have sustained it and the basic principles
have been challenged and contested.
The Policy Change: European Adaptive Pressures and Internal Dynamics
France. Despite some tensions among the traditional actors of electricity policy (in
particular between Cgt and Edf’s management) at the beginning of the European
liberalization process, French electricity policy presents a high degree of
institutionalization. The original model of nationalization, though it has evolved,
is still stable, and so are the relationships among the main actors in the policy
domain. At the end of the 1980s, the French government, responding to Edf’s need
to export its electro-nuclear surplus to foreign markets, promoted at European level
the creation of a common energy market. According to the French idea, this new
market would not create a radical change in its energy policy, because the project
was based upon co-operation among the national electricity companies of the
member states. However, when the debate at European level went in the direction of
a reform perceived as incompatible with national settings and traditions, with
the general issue of public service and the particular organizational model of the
electricity sector, the French position changed quickly. From that moment in the
early 1990s, the main actors in the ﬁeld of electricity policy were active in defending
domestic policy from European pressures. This defence revolved around two
diﬀerent but complementary elements: the idea of public service and the orga-
nizational model of an electricity industry based upon the intervention of the state
and vertically and horizontally integrated companies. On the ﬁrst issue, the
government and all the political parties perceived the Commission’s proposal to
liberalize the sector (and thus potentially expose public services to competitive
threats) as an explicit challenge to the French economic and social regulative system.
These actors thus mobilized themselves rapidly and eﬀectively. In the ﬁrst part of the
1990s, the French governments tried to convince other national governments of the
need to integrate the notion of general interest in European law and European
practice in certain economic sectors (He´ritier 2001). In the electricity sector, the
government – in agreement with Edf – committed itself in the formulation of
European electricity policy due to a negotiation with the other member states and
European Commission starting from the position expressed in the Rapport Mandile.
This report aimed to defend the French electricity sector by proposing the
introduction of the notion of a ‘‘Single Buyer’’, and by contesting the paradigm of
open markets in the energy sector. In this phase, all the main actors of domestic
policy perceived strong pressure to change and react in diﬀerent ways using diﬀerent
resources. The Ministry of Industry used its knowledge and expertise to propose an
organizational model for the electricity sector – elaborated in the Rapport Mandile –
which was diﬀerent from the market paradigm proposed by the Commission, and
which would only imply a marginal change of the traditional model. Trade unions
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mobilized a lot of workers and citizens, frequently invoking the idea of public service
(Cole 1999). Trade unions, in particular in the energy sector, were seen as a
legitimate actor in the defence of the public service concept. The mobilization
capacity of these actors and their legitimacy, including their clout vis-a`-vis many
political elites, forced the government to devote special attention to these issues in
the negotiations at the EU level. This situation was reinforced by the strikes which in
1995 put pressure on the Balladur government. In the same year, something at the
domestic level started to change. The French government reformulated the notion of
public service, to conform the regulation of many economic sectors to the internal
market programme (Cohen and Henry 1997). This process was very slow and
incremental, and it resulted in the 1990s in a new doctrine of public service that was
less ideological and more pragmatic: without transforming the main institutional
features of French economic governance in the energy sector, and without any
expressed adhesion to an external model, the French government proposed to
transform the national champion into a European champion.
The commitment of the French government to use all the concessions obtained in
the European negotiations (incorporated in Directive 92/96/EC), and to implement
only a marginal change was immediately evident. This decision, taken by a right-
wing government (Balladur), was conﬁrmed by a left-wing government (Jospin). The
transposition of Directive 92/96/EC conﬁrmed once again the stability and strength
of traditional actors of electricity policy and of the institutional setting established
during nationalization. Law 2000-108 of 10 February 2000 was approved with many
tensions among the left-wing parties in the government, and there was a convergence
with the opposition on the defence of public service and of the integrity of Edf’s
organizational structure. Essentially, no signiﬁcant political forces wanted a more
radical policy change with respect to the 1946 model. The French government opted
for the minimum rate of liberalization permitted by 96/92/EC, and Edf’s status and
role in the French energy system was conﬁrmed in the law of 10 February 2000 (and
in subsequent decisions); indeed, although by 2004 Edf had been partially privatized,
in accordance with the law of 9 August 2004, the French state was still required to
hold at least 70 per cent of the capital and voting rights.
Italy. The policy change started in 1991, and the process accelerated in 1992 in a
particular context of party system crisis and economic problems for the country. The
main role of the political parties in the policy domain made the policy evolution very
sensitive towards the redeﬁnition of political parties’ positions on economic policy
and state intervention in economic sectors. During the ﬁrst part of the 1990s, the
Italian government was not really involved in the policy formulation at the European
level. The debate was all centred on the domestic level, with the problems of public
ﬁnance guiding the decisions. The absence of a clear reform project was evident in
1992, when public ﬁnance problems pushed the government (led by Giuliano Amato)
to ignore this issue in order to transform Enel as soon as possible into a joint-stock
company. Only in 1994 did a debate take place on a general reform of the electricity
sector in order to overcome the nationalization framework in place. For the ﬁrst time
in this period, actors focused their attention on the ongoing debate at the European
level. The European policy, which at that time did not yet present a deﬁned legal
framework, began to spread its eﬀects at the national level. In an unstable
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institutional context – the repositioning of traditional actors was accompanied by the
entrance into the policy domain of new actors, such as the antitrust authority and
auto-producers in the electricity markets due to the law of 1991 – the ideas promoted
by the European Commission and by other states approving liberalization in energy
markets ﬁnally emerged in the national arena. During the ﬁrst part of 1990, without
any European legal framework for the electricity sector and, in this respect, without
real pressure to change arising from European law, the debate at the European level
was used to legitimize the positions of the actors which at national level were more
favourable to policy change. In this situation, the national preferences (such as the
project to transform the structure of the electricity industry by reducing Enel’s
generation capacity through divestitures) can be linked to European decisions. In
particular, national actors more favourable to policy change began to ‘‘use’’
European policy (Jacquot and Wall 2003). During the short-lived Dini government,
there was no dissent from European policy, and the national actors did not feel real
pressure to bring about change, partly because the domestic reform process in the
energy sector was continuing with the institution of the energy regulator, the AEEG
(law no. 481 of 14 November 1995). In this period, the policy domain was very
permeable to ideas and lessons coming from abroad. This is particularly true for the
draft Directive discussed by the European institutions (and particular reform
solutions such as the Single Buyer), but also for the ‘‘English reform’’ that was
promoted by the antitrust authority and by some political parties. The Italian
decision makers were searching for solutions. The negative lessons of past public
intervention made the defence of the traditional model untenable; the lessons from
abroad were used to legitimate national preferences in the reform process. At any
rate, the divisions between political parties in the government did not allow the
actors pushing for the reform (and particularly the Ministry of Industry) to
overcome the veto power of the Parliament. After 1996, with the new Prodi
government and with the Directive 96/92/EC approved, the reform process changed
again. The new Ministry of Industry (Bersani) wanted to undertake a reform more
drastic than the provisions of the Directive and more drastic than the approach of
the previous government. Throughout the work of the ‘‘Carpi Commission’’ –
instituted by the Ministry of Industry to elaborate a policy framework for the
electricity sector – the government incorporated national preferences into the
transposition of Directive 96/92/EC. Indeed, the political debate during the second
part of 1990, until the approval of law no. 79 of 1999 (the ‘‘Decreto Bersani’’) was
centred only on these issues. The Bersani Decree was not a simple application of 96/
92/EC; it represented a more incisive policy change. The Decree designed a new
organizational structure in the electricity sector, forced Enel to sell some power
plants, and liberalized the market beyond the European requirements (De Paoli
1999). During the debate on the Bersani Decree, no political actors at the national
level really contested European policy. The main political parties, in the government
and in the opposition, all viewed the European Directive as an opportunity to
transform Italian energy policy. Even the actors opposed to the national reform –
Enel’s management, trade unions, and the ‘‘Rifondazione Comunista’’ party in
Parliament – contested not the European policy but the way the Italian government
wanted to change the industrial structure and reduce Enel’s role in the national
market. The link between national preferences and the transposition of Directive
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96/92/EC was very important in overcoming opposition to the reforms favoured by
the government. Indeed, the government could beneﬁt in that period from a high
degree of legitimacy, as it presented the national reform as a ‘‘European reform’’; it
was not by chance that the policy change in the electricity sector, which began in
1991, concluded only on 19 February 1999, the expiry date of the period for the
transposition of Directive 96/92/EC. After the past reform eﬀorts had failed due to
the conﬂicts among political parties and due to the contingency of the political
system during the ﬁrst part of the 1990s, the path designed by the implementation of
European law created a strong incentive to approve the national reform, which was
presented as a European requirement. After the Bersani Decree, the transformation
of the energy sector continued with the privatization of Enel (the Italian state
currently has about the 30 per cent of the capital and voting rights) and with the
liberalization of the electricity market. Although the result is still not precisely what
was foreseen in the design of the reform, the change with respect to the prior
institutional framework is important (Lanza and Silva 2006).
Inconsistency, Institutionalization and Policy Change
When the European Commission elaborated its proposals for an internal energy
market, energy policies in both France and Italy were highly inconsistent with the
policy programme proposed. However, the electricity policies in these countries were
characterized by diﬀerent degrees of institutionalization: high in the French case, low
in the Italian case. Considering the indicators for the analyzed dimensions, the
results are indicated in Table 3.
The diﬀerent degrees of institutionalization of national energy policy can explain
the diﬀerent impact of Europeanization at the national level, i.e. the diﬀerent degrees
of policy change and the diverse pattern of policy development in France and Italy8
(Table 4).
In the French case, the electricity policy evolved in a path-dependent manner, and
it was led by the traditional main policy actors – trade unions, government and Edf’s
management. The result was a marginal adjustment of French policy in the direction
of the new policy regime proposed by the Commission, with the incorporation of
Table 3. Degree of institutionalization of French and Italian electricity policy
Degree of institutionalization
Cases
France Italy
Impermeability of policy
High High X
Low Low X
Policy output acceptance
High High X
Low Low X
Policy paradigm in policy domain (dominance by single paradigm)
High High X
Low Low X
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some of the new policy instruments but without a real change of policy goals.
European adaptive pressure, in line with the goodness-of-ﬁt hypothesis, was only
able to provoke a marginal change.
The development of the policy was a matter of ‘‘Classic’’ incremental type of
change in ends and means of the policy regime. As noted by Cashore and Howlett
(2007), the institutionalization of the policy objectives prevents the possible change
in policy settings. In the French case the stability and support for the policy
objectives – i.e. the leading role of the state in the energy domain – created an
institutionalized framework in which policy settings were likely to follow a classic
incremental pattern of development. The integrated industrial structure of Edf was
only partially aﬀected by the reform, liberalization and privatization developed
according to a classic incremental pattern, and the central government maintained a
strong control over the sector.9
In the Italian case, in a context of a low degree of institutionalization, European
adaptive pressure pushed domestic policy towards the new policy regime by
providing institutional and normative resources to domestic actors committed to
reform. The European policy process contributed to orient the faux paradigmatic
ﬂuctuation regarding the policy goals of the ﬁrst part of the 1990s towards the goals
of the ‘‘New’’ policy regime. The European policy also supports the objectives of
liberalization and privatization favouring a classical paradigmatic shift toward
these ends, and a progressive incremental move towards the implementation of the
market-oriented regime. As regards industrial structure, Enel was forced to sell some
power plants to reduce its market power; moreover, an authority has been created
since 1995 as means of government and a wholesale electricity market was planned in
Table 4. Pattern of electricity policy development in France (F) and Italy (I), 1990–2000
Policy content
Goals Objectives Settings
Policy focus
Ends F: Classic
Incremental
development of
policy goals
F: Classic Incremental
development of
liberalization and
privatization
F: Classic Incremental change
in industrial structure
(marginal change of EDF
industrial structure)
I: Faux paradigmatic
ﬂuctuation between
competing goals
I: Classic Paradigmatic
shift towards
liberalization and
privatization
I: Classic Paradigmatic shift in
industrial structure (ENEL
was forced to sell some
power plants)
Means F: Classic
Incremental
developments of
regulation
F: Classic Incremental
implementation of
liberalization and
privatization
F: Classical incremental
implementation of
regulation and market
mechanism of co-ordination
I: Progressive
Incremental
development of
regulation
I: Progressive
incremental
implementation of
liberalization and
privatization
I: Progressive incremental
implementation of
regulation and market
mechanism of co-ordination
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the reform of 1999.10 As pointed out by Cashore and Howlett (2007), the progressive
incremental pattern of development is diﬀerent from the classical incremental
pattern. The ﬁrst is a cumulative change leading away from an existing equilibrium
toward another; the latter represents a ﬂuctuation consistent with the previous policy
equilibrium.
Following the theoretical proposal of institutional change pointed out by Streeck
and Thelen (2005), the French and Italian cases show diﬀerent types of institutional
transformation. In the ﬁrst case the change is less radical and it could be interpreted
as a matter of conversion; the main policy actors at national level incorporated in the
old institutional structure the purpose of the new policy regime promoted by
European Commission. This process produced a redirection in the goals of the
government: from support Edf becoming a National Champion to support Edf
becoming a European Champion in the context of a liberalized electricity market. In
the latter, the integration of the elements of the new policy regime in to existing
institutions at national level gradually challenge their status and structure, according
to the logic of layering; then the exogenous pressure from the European level
provokes a major policy change challenging the previous compromise between the
old and new regime.
Conclusion
In the case of a high degree of institutionalization, the hypothesis of the goodness-of-
ﬁt framework, i.e. low domestic change where there is high inconsistency, is
conﬁrmed; the domestic institutions defend their ‘‘turf’’. In a situation of high
inconsistency but low institutionalization at a domestic level, the impact of
Europeanization is diﬀerent. In this case, European adaptive pressures can provoke
major change and push national policy towards a new equilibrium, for example by
providing institutional resources to a coalition of actors which act at a domestic level
to achieve policy change. While the goodness-of-ﬁt model in the case of high
adaptive pressure implies a low degree of domestic policy change, the ﬁndings of the
research suggest that relationships can be diﬀerent, reﬂecting the diﬀerent degrees of
institutionalization. Institutionalization is an intervening variable, which mediates
the impact of adaptive pressures at the domestic level. The contribution is important
because it integrates the two logics of change discussed by Bo¨rzel and Risse (2003:
73), and because it has the potential to predict the outcomes of Europeanization
under high adaptive pressure.
Notes
1. The ﬁndings of the empirical research are the results of my PhD dissertation, defended at the
University of Florence in 2007 and now published as L’europeizzazione della politica energetica in
Italia e Francia, Eum, Macerata, 2008.
2. On the features of the new market approach to energy and electricity sector, see Helm et al. (1989) and
Helm (2004); on the market approach as a new paradigm in energy policy with consistent policy
objectives and policy instruments, see Helm (2005). On the institutionalization of this new paradigm at
EU-level energy policy during the 1990s, see Andersen (1999).
3. As noted by March and Olsen (1989) and by the new institutionalism literature in general, an
institution is not necessarily a formal structure. On the meaning of institutions in new institutional
theory, see Peters (1999).
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4. Historical institutionalism (Pierson 2000, Pierson and Skocpol 2000) reveals that institutionalization is
the result of a long-term process. According to Pierson (2000: 75), ‘‘Once a particular path gets
established self-reinforcing processes are prone to consolidation or institutionalization’’.
5. As pointed out by Lanzalaco (1995), there are not many scholars who consider the operational
characteristics of institutionalization and the respective empirical indicators; these key elements
derived from seminal studies which analyzed the problem from diﬀerent perspectives. These include
Huntington (1975), Polsby (1968), Zucker (1987), Di Maggio (1986), Pfeﬀer (1981) and Janicke (1991).
6. I derive this policy dimension from empirical research which attempt to propose indicators for the
institutionalization of policy, in particular: Lanzalaco (1995), Lenschow and Zito (1998), and Tebaldi
(1999).
7. According to Hall (1993: 279), a policy paradigm is the interpretative framework of ideas and
standards that speciﬁes the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them,
and the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing.
8. In order to analyze the pattern of policy development and the policy change in the policy focus and
content in both France and Italy I use the taxonomy of Cashore and Howlett (2007).
9. On the evolution of regulation and industrial structure in the French electricity sector in 1990s, see
Finon (1996, 2003). On the pace and timing of liberalization and on the implementation of the internal
electricity market, see the reports of the European Commission (2001, 2003).
10. On the evolution of regulation and of industrial structure in the Italian electricity sector in the 1990s,
see De Paoli (1999, 2001), and Campidoglio and Vaciago (1999). On the pace and timing of
liberalization and on the implementation of the internal electricity market, see the reports of the
European Commission (2001, 2003).
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